China Is Building Fighters At Scale: Time To Step Up F-35 Procurement

Whether the U.S. Air Force (USAF) requires a larger, modern fighter force is no longer an open question—it does. China's military is on track to have the largest fighter force in the world, surpassing the United States in comparative numbers within this decade. This represents a dangerous shift in the global military balance. At the same time, instability from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific continues to drive demand for advanced American airpower. While Operation Epic Fury results over Iran to date are impressive, the sca le and scope of that conflict pales in comparison to what we would require for a larger conflict.

The Air Force's fighter inventory has shrunk over 60 percent since the end of the Cold War and has been flown relentlessly in combat ever since. Today those aircraft—and their crews—are worn hard. Yet missions such as air superiority and strike remain central to deterrence and warfighting as evidenced by recent results over Iran. If the United States intends to maintain military primacy, the Tru mp administration and Congress must accelerate procurement of modern fighters. The warning lights are already flashing that it is time to accelerate investment in these forces.

At the center of that effort is the F-35A, which the Air Force itself describes as "the foundation of the USAF fighter force structure." Delivering on that promise requires four things: expanding fighter capacity, stabilizing procurement, continuing modernization, and improving readiness.

Capacity Matters

The Air Fo rce that won the Cold War fielded more than 4,000 fighters, most less than a decade old. Today the service operates roughly 1,100 fighters in its primary mission aircraft inventory—the aircraft available for real-world operations—and their average age is around 30 years.

Air Force analysis identifies a requirement for more than 1,500 fighters. When accounting for growing homeland defense demands, missile defense requirements, and the attrition expected in a peer conflict, that number may prove to be much higher.

During the Cold War, the fighter force focused primarily on one adversary: the Soviet Union. Today the United States faces a far broader set of challenges—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and persistent homeland defense requirements.

Aircraft—and their pilots—cannot be in two places at once. Capacity matters.

Without sufficient numbers, the existing force is stretched thin. Fighters and crews deploy repeatedly, disrupting training cycles, delaying major maintenance, and eroding readiness.

Recent operations illustrate the strain. F-35As that participated in the removal of Maduro from Venezuela were quickly redeployed to the Middle East during rising tensions with Iran. Some did not even make it back to the U.S. to reset. The reality is that demand is particularly high for stealth fighters that can leverage sensor fusion and networking capabilities—attributes that allow them to support operations far beyond traditional strike missions. If a concurrent fight were to erupt while Operation Epic Fury was underway, demand for U.S. fighters—especially the F-35A—would rapidly exceed supply.

China's Airpower Is Expanding Faster

For decade s many Americans viewed major war as theoretical. That complacency was, and remains, dangerous.

China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its airpower. Since 2021, Beijing has added more than eight million square feet of aircraft manufacturing capacity—larger than the F-35 production facility in Fort Worth. The reason is straightforward: China is in the middle of a massive combat aviation buildup reminiscent of the U.S. modernization surge during the Reagan administration.

China's J-20 stealth fighter fleet already exceeds the size of the Air Force's F-22 inventory. Analysts estimate China could produce as many as 300 fighters annually by 2028. Current projections suggest the PLAAF is on track to surpass the United States in both combat aircraft size and modernization by the end of the decade.

The contrast with U.S. procur ement trends is stark. In its FY2026 budget request, the Air Force proposed retiring 258 fighters, while purchasing just 45 new aircraft.

For years, Air Force leaders have said they must procure at least 72 fighters annually simply to prevent the fleet from shrinking. Prior to the FY2024 budget request, the last time the Air Force purchased 72 or more fighters in a single year was 1998—more than a quarter century ago. Buying fewer than that causes the fighter inventory to shrink, which is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. After decades of deferred modernization, the necessary procurement rate is now significantly higher.

The consequences are already visible. Okinawa—one of America's most strategically important locations in the Pacific no longer has permanently assigned fighters. The Maryland Air National Guard lost its flying mission in 2025 when its A-10s were retired without replacement. In both cases, insufficient procurement forced capacity reductions.

The Air Force's fighter force structure assessment acknowledges the problem and recommends maximizing production of aircraft already in production. For the F-35A that would mean roughly 72 aircraft annually. Additional procurement of aircraft such as the F-15EX and the emerging F-47 will also be necessary.

During the Reagan buildup, the Air Force purchased nearly 200 fighters per ye ar. Given today's aging fleet, those numbers represent replacement—not expansion.

Procurement Stability Matters

Expanding production requires predictable demand.

Pentagon plans in the early 2000s projected the Air Force buying roughly 80 F-35s annually beginning in the mid-2010s. Reality has been far different. Procurement has ranged from more than 60 aircraft in some years to as few as 24 in FY2026.

This volatility makes it extremely difficult for industry to invest in additional production capacity, particularly among smaller suppliers deeper in the supply chain.

Workforces, specialized equipment, and production space cannot expand and contract with yearly budget swings. Businesses simply cannot operate effectively under those conditions.

Lockheed Martin has attempted to stabilize production by using international orders as a buffer against fluctuating U.S. demand. But that approach has limits.

A multi-year procurement contract would provide the stability necessary for the industrial base to expand production and lower costs through economies of scale. These agreements typically deliver savings of roughly ten percent—stretching both U.S. and allied defense budgets further.

Expanded production is also necessary to meet growing international demand. Many allied nations delayed airpower modernization and now urgently require new aircraft. If the United States cannot meet that demand, partners will inevitably seek alternatives—undermining both U.S. economic interests and the operational advantages of allied interoperability.

Modernization Cannot Slow

The F-35 is not simply another fighter aircraft. It is an information-age combat system whose low-observability, sensors, computing power, electronic warfare capabilities, and connectivity are as important as its weapons.

Operation Epic Fury over Iran illustrates this evolution. In these missions stealth aircraft act as airborne data nodes—collecting intelligence inside contested airspace and distributing it across the entire military force in real time. In such operations, the aircraft's ability to fuse information and direct other aircraft can be as decisive as its ability to deliver weapons.

Maintaining that advantage requires continued modernization. Major upgrades like technical refresh (TR) 3 and block 4 have dominated news headlines in recent years and significant progress has been made with both. However, modernization is a continual effort that demands sustained in vestment given the evolution of threats.

One of the biggest examples in this regard ties to generating additional power and cooling for a combat aircraft that is a flying supercomputer. Early F-35 variants required roughly 15 kilowatts of electrical power. Current mission systems require more than 30 kilowatts, and future upgrades could push demand toward 80 kilowatts. This is a good news story because it means the F-35 has growing capability. However, investments must be made to support that growth.

Meeting those requirements will require upgrades to both the aircraft's engine core and its power-thermal management systems (PTMS). Pratt and Whitney is progressing on the engine front and there are options for the PTMS, including a program known as enhanced power and cooling system (EPACS). These foundational improvements rarely attract headlines, but they are essential to enabling future capability growth.

Readiness Matters

Eve n the most advanced aircraft is only useful if it is ready to fly.

Improving F-35 readiness requires progress on two fronts. First, sustainment costs must continue to decline. Encouraging progress has already been made: the cost per flying hour dropped dramatically between 2014 and 2022. Further progress must continue as the Air Force must be able to afford to operate the aircraft it acquires.

Second, the services must adequately fund operations and maintenance accounts—particularly spare parts.

When supplied with sufficient parts, F-35 mission capable rates can exceed 90 percent in operational deployments. At home stations, however, aircraft sometimes sit idle waiting for components to be repaired or replaced. That is a major reason why Air Force leaders are making such a big push to boost readiness.

Because the F-35 operates through a shared global sustainment enterprise across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, all services must contribute adequately to sustain readiness. This is an area in major need of a funding boost. The FY26 defense budget made an important downpayment in that regard, but the investment must continue.

The Strategic Choice

Current headlines demonstrate what modern airpower can achieve. The striking military success of Operation Epic Fury rests on a campaign built around airpower. Aircrews are accomplishing what many once considered impossible, building on gains achieved less than a year ago when Israeli and U.S. aircraft struck critical targets deep inside Iran. Those operations reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East—within some of the most heavily defended airspace in the world—and the F-35 was central to that success.

Just a few hundred miles away, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine offers a stark contrast. There, the conflict has devolved into grinding attrition reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. The difference is clear: over Iran, we see the decisive effects of effectively employed modern airpower. Over Russia and Ukraine, by contrast, neither side has achieved air superiority—leaving the battlefield contested and the war locked in costly stalemate.

Th e F-35 is the cornerstone of America's future air dominance, providing the asymmetric advantage needed to deter adversaries and prevail in conflict. But that advantage exists only if the United States fields the aircraft in meaningful numbers.

China is producing fighters at scale. To meet that challenge the United States must double down on the F-35—expand production capacity, continue its modernization, and stabilize procurement at 72 F-35As annually for the U.S. Air Force.